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Since the publication of Hulsewé’s pioneering work on Han law in the 1950s,1
our knowledge of the subject has been revolutionized through the discovery in
archaeological excavations of numerous texts dealing with the laws of the Qin
and Han dynasties from around the third century BCE to the second century CE.
The earlier discoveries, made in 1975, brought to light a wide variety of legal
texts of the fourth and third centuries BCE concerning the laws applied in the
Qin state and empire. A good translation into English, with commentary, has
been available since 1985.2 Later discoveries include a good deal of legal
material relating to the Han as well as the Qin. One of the most important of
these finds comprised both a collection of statutes promulgated in 186 BCE
(Ernian lüling) and a collection of cases from the early years of the Han, a few
even predating the Han (Zouyanshu). These cases or precedents are in the main
concerned with doubtful points of law decided by the highest court.
The procedure for handling “doubtful cases” was established at the very
beginning of the Han dynasty by Gaozu in an edict of 200 BCE. This edict provided
that, where a prefecture experienced a doubt in establishing the correct punish-
ment for an offence, the matter was to be referred to the next highest adminis-
trative level, the commandery. If the commandery was still in doubt, the matter
was to be referred to the highest court of the empire, that of the commandant of
justice (tingwei) in the capital. If even this court could not come to a decision,
there was an ultimate reference to the throne.3 It is hardly a coincidence that a
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collection of “doubtful cases”, providing models for future investigations, should
appear within a few years of the Han founder’s edict.
The bamboo slips containing the Ernian lüling and the Zouyanshu were first
properly transcribed, edited, and published in 2001. Since then there have
been numerous studies in Chinese and Japanese, relatively few in a Western
language. Only a few cases have been translated into English.4 The work under
review, the importance of which cannot be overstated, is the first to offer a
complete translation into a Western language of the Zouyanshu. A model of
exemplary scholarship, the book has a comprehensive introduction not
just on the nature of the cases contained in the Zouyanshu but also on the
principles that characterized Qin/Han penal law in general. The core of the
book is the text and translation of the twenty cases of the Zouyanshu, each
translation enriched with a detailed historical, philological, and legal com-
mentary. Useful appendices summarise the fundamental procedural steps in a
trial and list inter alia the legislation (statutes (lü) and ordinances (ling)) cited
in the cases.
The introduction alone is probably the best concise account in a Western
language of the legal procedure and general principles of Qin and early Han
law. Apart from giving a thorough account of the finding and editing of the
bamboo slips that compose the Zouyanshu, the authors describe in detail both
the way in which legal proceedings were conducted in courts of all levels and
the criteria for the review of a case by the highest court in the capital (that of
the tingwei) or even by the emperor himself. The most important ground for
referral of a case was a doubt either as to which of a number of statutory rules
best applied to the facts or as to the interpretation of a particular rule.5 But
“doubt” was not the only ground of referral. In particular, the rank of the
person accused as well as the gravity of the offence constituted other grounds
(cases XIV, XV, and XVI). In one case (XVII), a person of low status who had
been convicted of theft and sentenced to hard labour was permitted to have his
conviction reopened on the ground that his confession had been (wrongly)
extracted by torture.
4 Case XXI has been translated with a full commentary by Nylan 2005–2006. There is a
translation of case XVII in Csikszentmihalyi 2006: 29–35. An important study by M. Korolkov
translates large parts or gives substantial summaries of cases I, II, III, XVII, XVIII, and XXII. See
Korolkov 2011. Michael Loewe has summarised case XVIII in Loewe 2006: 131–133. Three cases
on absconding slaves (II, V, and VIII) are summarised by R. Yates 2014.
5 One probably should bring out more clearly than do the authors (9 n32) the very different
concept of “doubtful offences” in the Tang code (article 502), where the reference is to a doubt
as to the facts not the law.
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The introduction further offers an illuminating account of two fundamen-
tal characteristics of Chinese criminal law, that endured throughout the whole
history of the criminal law until the end of the Qing. These are the so-called
“subjective” element in crime, that is, the relevance of the perpetrator’s inten-
tion or knowledge to the commission of the offence, and the notion of “col-
lective liability”, that is, the ways in which persons other than the actual
perpetrator were involved in liability. The authors properly distinguish
between two types of joint or collective liability: the liability of persons who
are guilty in the sense that they have conspired with, assisted, or concealed
the person who committed the offence and the liability of persons, themselves
innocent, who are made guilty by association, such as relatives, neighbours, or
official colleagues.
The language of the cases included in the Zouyanshu is both technical and
extremely concise. Hence a great deal of explanation is required to make the
facts and the reasoning of the investigators fully intelligible. The authors supply
this help through both summaries prefacing the translation of each case and an
extensive apparatus of footnotes. The latter not only deal with the numerous
philological problems raised by the text but provide extremely useful informa-
tion on the content of the laws cited in the cases. Many of these laws can be
found in the Ernian lüling, promulgated ten years after the date of the latest case
in the Zouyanshu. One is thus enabled to see the continuity in legislation from
the Qin to the first decades of Han rule.
The twenty two cases of the Zouyanshu all illustrate different and important
aspects of procedure: the methods of investigation and interrogation, confronta-
tion of the accused with the evidence against him, identification of relevant
laws, the conditions under which torture might be employed, and the appro-
priate grounds for review of a decision by higher authorities.6 The focus of the
investigation, as emerges very clearly from a reading of the cases, was the
necessity not just to establish the true facts and identify the relevant laws but
to do so in such a way as to obtain from the accused an acknowledgment of
guilt. Without such an admission it does not appear that judgment could be
pronounced.
The reasons for the final judgment are never stated in the documents.
Sometimes these reasons can be gathered from the record of earlier proceedings
in which the arguments for a particular interpretation of the law have been
advanced by a lower court. The final judgment need not have been the
6 The principles of investigation illustrated by the decisions agree with those stated in a model
for the conduct of interrogations in trials found in the Qin legal documents from the third
century BCE. See Hulsewé 1985: 183–184 (E1, E2).
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unanimous opinion of all the judges making up the highest court under the
direction of the tingwei. In some cases (I, II, and XXI) we have references to
differences of opinion among the judges.
The cases differ considerably in the interest they have for the substantive
law. A number deal with regulations, intrinsically of a temporary nature,
devised for the handling of problems arising from the Qin-Han transition such
as the treatment of absconding slaves (II, IV, and VIII), the relationship between
the central state and the semi-independent kingdoms, created on the establish-
ment of the Han but dissolved by the middle of the second century BCE (III), and
the military obligations of ethnic minorities or other matters of military law
(I, XVIII). But some cases certainly make significant points about the interpreta-
tion of statutes that formed part of the permanent laws of the Han and later
dynasties.
First, we have an important decision which utilises a distinction central in
the whole history of the traditional penal law, that between wounding or
killing in a fight (dou shang/sha) and intentional wounding or killing
(gu (zei) shang/sha). Where a suspected criminal resisted arrest and wounded
or killed the person seeking to arrest him, the codes of all dynasties treated the
offence not as wounding or killing in a fight but as intentional wounding or
killing. But what was the position where the suspected person was in fact
innocent, and conscious of this fact, put up a resistance which resulted in the
injury or death of the arrester? In 197 BCE the court of the tingwei held that
innocence made no difference. The person arrested, even though he had not
committed the offence for which he was sought, was still to be sentenced on
the basis of intentional wounding/killing and not on the basis of wounding/
killing in a fight (case V).
Several cases concern the offence of “falsification of documents” (wei shu)
(IX, X, XI, XII), of which the most interesting is case XII. Here a minor official,
employed in the courier service, delayed a despatch beyond the permitted time
for forwarding it. He attempted to conceal the delay by altering the date on the
covering document. Although the despatch itself had not been altered, he was
still convicted by the highest court of the offence of “falsification of documents”.
Another case (VII) extends the offence of “offering or taking bribes and subvert-
ing the law” (shou xing qiu wang fa), normally applicable in the context of
official misbehaviour (see case XIII), to a woman who was bribed by a fugitive
slave not to proceed with his prosecution as required by law.
Probably the most intriguing of the decisions reported in the Zouyanshu is
that, probably from the Qin period, in which a woman was prosecuted for
the offence of illicit sexual intercourse committed during the funeral rites for
her husband (case XXI). No straightforward conviction appears to have been
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possible because she had not been caught and denounced in flagrante delicto.7
The highest court, anxious to hold the woman liable for so grave a violation of
ritual propriety, constructed an elaborate process of reasoning under which she
was held to have committed the offence of lack of filial piety of the second
grade. Lack of filial piety of the first grade was disrespect and disobedience to
parents, warranting death. Lack of filial piety of the second grade consisted of
disrespect directed at one’s husband and warranted the punishment of tattooing
and forced labour. This ruling is of great interest since it appears to be the only
time in a legal context in which lack of filial piety is invoked as an offence
against a husband. Unfortunately for the judges, a court official, not present at
the hearing, returned and argued convincingly that the difference between a
living and a dead husband was crucial. Since in this case the act of illicit sexual
intercourse had taken place after the husband’s death, it could not be construed
as an act of disrespect to him. Hence the widow could not be convicted and
sentenced in the manner proposed by the court. The judges accepted the argu-
ment and declared their own judgment to have been mistaken.
On a few matters touched on by the authors it is possible to express some
reservation. One such matter is the authors’ invocation of talio as a description
of the Qin/Han system of punishment (71). Although early Chinese law punished
homicide with death and physical injury with some form of mutilation (amputa-
tion of nose or foot), it is difficult to see in this an example, strictly speaking, of
talio. The essence of talio is that a like injury should be inflicted on the person
who had inflicted it (eye for an eye and so on). Such a relationship between
injury and response never characterised Chinese law.
From time to time the authors refer to the “Confucianization of the law”, a
process by which the law of the state gradually came to incorporate elements of
Confucian morality. Whatever may have been the position under the Tang and
Sung dynasties, it is in fact highly doubtful whether the Han knew any process
of legal change which could be subsumed under the head of “Confuzianization
of the law”. Even the term “Confucian” as a general description of moral
attitudes8 is not necessarily appropriate at this time.9
There is some difference of opinion on the scholarly literature on the
reasons for the inclusion of case XXII in the collection. The authors argue that
7 A different view is offered by Nylan in the essay cited in note 4 above. Oddly, the authors,
although they include the essay in the main bibliography, pay no attention to it in their
translation of the case.
8 In one note (1436) the authors, probably rashly, explain the term ru as “Confucian”.
9 The difficulties with the process described as “Confucianization of the law” are discussed in
detail in MacCormack 2008.
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its appearance is due to the excellence of the methods of investigation which it
displays. Hence it was selected to serve as a model for later officials in the
conduct of an investigation. However, Korolkov cites the case primarily as an
example (in contrast to case XVII) of the proper application of torture in an
investigation.10
More can perhaps be extracted from case XIX than the authors suggest. This
is one of the two decisions allegedly from the period of the Spring and Autumn
(771–464 BCE) contained in the Zouyanshu. It concerned the discovery by the
ruler of the state of Wei of a hair in his soup and a blade of grass in the food
prepared for his wife. The record of the case reports the statesman entrusted
with the sentencing of the offence as arguing that the intrusion of impurities in
the ruler’s food was not the fault of the cooks or serving maids. The hair had
dropped into the soup from a whisk used to fan the ruler while he was eating.
The blade of grass had originated in the damaged rush mat of the serving maid
and become attached to her worn out gown from which it had descended into
the food of the ruler’s wife.
The authors treat the decision as an example of a particular form of inves-
tigation rather than of the interpretation of a rule of law. It is perfectly possible,
however, that we do have in the case a problem raised by the wording of the
statute cited at the beginning of the report: “who in the preparation of food for
the ruler or his wife has not been careful is to be condemned to death”.11 The
central issue was the meaning of the phrase bu jin (not careful) in the Wei
statute, which may have imposed a very high standard of care on the cooks and
servitors concerned with the ruler’s food. The investigator’s uncovering of the
circumstances in which the impurities had entered the food showed that there
had been no breach of this standard.
The other case from the Spring and Autumn (XX) also prompts further
reflection. It is of great interest for the development of law during the Spring
and Autumn because it cites at least part of the statutes of the state of Lu
concerned with theft. The authors suggest that the case was included in the
Zouyanshu as an illustration of the basic principles underlying the law.
10 Korolkov 2011: 63–65. This study (see note 4) probably appeared too late for consideration
by the authors.
11 Rules of this kind were common in the principalities and kingdoms of the pre-imperial
period. To the references given by the authors (n1342) can be added Lunheng jijie (Liu Pansui
(ed.), Taipei, 1975), 1, 119 (book 6), translated in Forke 1962: 156. This work describes a case in
which king Hui of Chu (487–430 BCE) found a leech in his salad, a capital offence on the part of
those responsible for preparation of the ruler’s food. The Tang code (article 103) punished with
penal servitude for two years the appearance of “unclean articles” in the emperor’s food:
Johnson 1997: 73.
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The statute quoted at the beginning of the document, if taken literally, shows
that the state of Lu already in the fifth, if not the sixth, century BCE possessed
rules punishing theft similar to those in force at the beginning of the Han. Theft
was to be punished with a fine or a period of forced labour, the severity of which
depended upon the value of what was stolen.12 The nub of the decision is the
sentence of a minor official to a punishment more severe than that warranted by
the value of the grain he had stolen from the state. The judge in effect justified
the higher punishment on the ground that the offender had not exhibited the
standard of behaviour expected of him as an official and scholar.
One might say, as do the authors, that the judge is here invoking a basic
principle of morality underlying the law. But it is also possible that we have here
the beginning of that process of legal reasoning which culminated in later law in
the enactments of rules imposing on officials who stole from the government a
higher degree of liability than that imposed on an ordinary person who stole
property of the same value.13
Generally, we can say that in their meticulously documented and tightly
written study the authors offer an enormous amount of information with respect
to the development of the law at one of the critical junctures in Chinese legal
history, the Qin-Han transition. It is to be hoped that the publication of an
accompanying translation of the Ernian lüling will not be long delayed.
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